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PROBLEMS OF OTHER MINDS: SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS IN 
ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY  
 
While there is a great diversity of treatments of other minds and inter-subjectivity 
within both analytic and continental philosophy, this essay aims to specify some of 
the core structural differences between these treatments. Although there is no 
canonical account of the problem(s) of other minds that can be baldly stated and that 
is exhaustive of both traditions, it can be loosely defined in family resemblances 
terms. It seems to have: 1. an epistemological dimension (How do we know that 
others exist? Can we justifiably claim to know that they do?); 2. an ontological 
dimension that incorporates issues to do with personal identity (What is the structure 
of our world such that inter-subjectivity is possible? What are the fundamental aspects 
of our relations to others and how do they impact upon/constitute our self-identity?); 
and 3. it also depends on one’s answer to the question what is a mind (How does the 
mind – or the concept of ‘mind’ – relate to the brain, the body, and the world?). While 
these three issues are co-imbricated, I will claim that analytic engagements with the 
problem of other minds focus on 1, whereas continental philosophers focus far more 
on 2. In addition, this essay will also point to various other downstream consequences 
of this, including the preoccupation with embodiment and forms of expressivism that 
feature heavily in various forms of continental philosophy, and which generally aim 
to ground our relations with others in a pre-reflective manner of inhabiting the world 
that is said to be the condition of reflection and knowledge. 
 
1. a) ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 
 
Analytic philosophy’s interest in the problem of other minds is typically posed in 
epistemic terms. The core problem is that we have two competing intuitions about our 
knowledge of the existence of the other that both have some prima facie plausibility: 
a behaviourist intuition that in our daily life we do in fact know others with reliability 
(cf. Ryle); and a Cartesian one that insists that there is something about the other 
(their mental life) that necessarily remains unknowable (Overgaard 250). For most, 
however, the issue of subjectivity (and hence inter-subjectivity) has been too quickly 
dispensed with by behaviourism’s strict eliminativism about the mental, which 
resolves the problem of others minds by fiat, and analytic philosophy has since 
concluded, almost univocally, that the view that the other is simply their behaviour 
cannot be right. After all, others are often enigmatic and confusing, and the consensus 
is that Ryle’s main insight – that the mental is importantly related to behavioural 
response or output – can be readily accommodated within contemporary forms of 
functionalism. If the behaviourist solution is eschewed, however, we seem to be left 
without the required intellectual resources to adequately confront the sceptical 
problem regarding how we can know that there really are other minds, and how we 
are to distinguish creatures with such minds (persons) from Zombies. Without the 
behaviourist’s entailment relation between pain behaviour and pain, it seems that the 
best we can do is to argue by analogy from our own experiences of the relationship 
between us having mental states and behaving in certain ways, as was suggested by 
Mill (p191) and A. J. Ayer (p191-214). Arguments by analogy are, however, at best 
probabilistic, and probabilistic claims (or generalisations) based on a single 
experience seem rather irresponsible (Wittgenstein 293). Moreover, they do not 
capture either the judgments of common-sense/folk psychology on this issue, or our 
pre-reflective relationship with others that phenomenology aims to describe and 
disclose. 
Faced with the inductive problem of arguments by analogy (i.e. one case is not 
sufficient) one can respond in either of two main ways: 1. improve the argument from 
analogy, and/or supplement it with other inductive arguments; 2. give up the 
inferential problematic and find another way of showing how belief is justified (Stern 
220). Most continental philosophers pursue some version of the second alternative – 
e.g. some norms are said to be grounded in perception rather than inference, and there 
is often claimed to be a transcendental conception of normativity, whether it be the 
structure of our perceptual being-in the-world, or Apel and Habermas’ claim that 
everyday conversation and argument presupposes certain regulative ideals that we 
should endeavour to live up to. Analytic attempts to pursue this strategy are much 
rarer, confined to the post-Wittgensteinian tradition of conceptual and criteria-based 
solutions to the problem. The claim made by Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm and 
Peter Strawson in different ways, is that the required link between the observed 
behaviour of the other and the attribution of mental states to them is neither an 
inductive inference, nor a direct entailment (as in behaviourism); rather, the 
relationship between mental states and behaviour is claimed to be criterial (Hyslop). It 
remains, however, a comparatively marginal position within analytic philosophy, due 
to ambiguities surrounding the use and abuse of the idea of criteria and the abiding 
concern to integrate with the findings of the sciences.  
Most contemporary analytic responses to the problem of other minds hence 
attempt the first option: to reconstrue the argument by analogy and present it in a 
hybrid form that incorporates inference to the best explanation and hence imbues the 
argument with a status akin to a scientific theory. As Alec Hyslop suggests, “the 
guiding thought is that the mental states of human beings are what cause them to 
behave as they do. So, the inference to their having minds is one based on that being 
the best explanation for the way they behave” (Hyslop).  
It is also important to recognise that much of the recent literature has centred 
around debates about ‘folk psychology’. The folk have a faith that other people exist, 
and, on this view, they also evince an everyday ability to fairly accurately attribute 
desires, beliefs, and intentionality to other people despite the possibility of them being 
but cloaks and springs. The task for the analytic philosopher that takes this datum 
seriously (not all do) becomes one of explaining how this common sense folk 
psychology about the other might have come about, how it functions, what roles it 
plays in regard to meaning, reference-fixing, and to answer some more technical 
questions, such as to what extent is our mastery of folk psychology a matter of 
representation-possession, and how special-purpose and/or innate is the 
mechanism underwriting our folk psychological competence? Despite the 
problem of other minds sometimes being considered to be marginal, these debates 
have significant consequences for two of the dominant positions in philosophy of 
mind. As Nicholls and Stich suggest, “if functionalists conceive of folk psychology as 
the body of information that underlies mind-reading, and there is no such body of 
information, then the functionalist account of the meaning of mental state terms must 
be mistaken, since there is no folk theory to implicitly define these terms. And if there 
is no folk theory underlying mind-reading, then it cannot be the case that folk 
psychology is a radically mistaken theory as the eliminativists insist” (Nicholls & 
Stich 9).  
Two main answers to the questions regarding folk psychology have been 
proffered in recent times, labelled respectively ‘Theory Theory’ and ‘Simulation 
Theory’. To the above questions in bold, TT generally answers (1) ‘a lot’ and (2) ‘not 
much’i. ST generally answers (1) ‘not much’ and (2) ‘a lot’ii. Of course, both come in 
different forms, as well as hybrid ones, but on the standard TT view it is because we 
have an implicit theory (with rules, etc.) that we are able to identify other minds and 
predict their behaviour with some competence. TT is hence inferential and quasi-
scientific, in that other minds are more like hypothesised entities than immediate 
givens, and we infer from observed public behaviour to a hidden mental cause. Prima 
facie, however, TT is confronted with an obvious problem if such a mechanism is said 
to be central to understanding others. Given that children seem to lack a suitably 
developed theory of mind, being without the required inferential abilities (and 
especially the awareness of others as mental agents with beliefs different from their 
own), TT seems committed to the view that there is no experience of minded beings, 
and thus no genuine understanding of self and other, until roughly 4 years of age. One 
might accept this consequence, defining mental states narrowly such that children 
don’t have them at all and that we are initially essentially an interior and private mind 
until ‘theory theory’ kicks in (Gallagher and Zahavi 176). Such a radical shift may, 
however, be difficult to explain. Alternatively, one might adopt a gradualist thesis that 
deflects the force of this counter-intuitive result regarding children and ‘mindedness’, 
and which attempts to come to terms with findings in developmental psychology and 
the brain sciences. For example, it might be argued that there is some quasi-
understanding of others evinced when the child is able from birth to distinguish 
humans from non-human and playfully imitate only the former, but maintain that 
infants lack fully-fledged representational mental states.  
For Simulation Theory, on the other hand, we represent the mental activities 
of others by mentally simulating them, or by simulating similar activities and 
processes (for some versions of ST this is said to happen at the subconscious level). 
The explicit version of ST remains within the argument by analogy paradigm, in that 
it contends that the processes that our brain uses to guide and understand our own 
behaviour can also make possible representations of other people. Rather than 
maintaining that we have some general information (or theory) that makes it possible, 
we use our own mind (and behavioural processes) as a model of what the other’s 
mind might be like, mainly through imagination according to Alvin Goldman (p161-
85). This position denies that mental theorising is at bottom what is going on, and 
draws attention to the emotional and imaginative aspects of our relations with others. 
For Goldman, we have a privileged understanding of our own mind through 
introspection, and using these resources we then attempt to put ourselves in the 
other’s shoes.  
As a response to the problem of other minds, however, this seems problematic. 
To try and consciously put ourselves in the other’s shoes presupposes that we already 
have some understanding that they are in fact others. Likewise, to see the similarity 
between my pain and the other’s pain I have to already understand their gestures as 
expressive phenomena that are bound up with other minds rather than mere 
automatons, and it thus begs the question. Another problem is that there seems to be 
little phenomenological evidence of the indispensability of such introspective and 
imaginative simulations to our everyday dealings with others. As Wittgenstein is 
reputed to have said, do we look within ourselves in order to recognise the other’s 
fury? 
One solution to this problem is to abandon Goldman’s insistence upon the 
importance of introspection and the imagination, and to maintain that the simulations 
are subconscious or subpersonal, thus bypassing the phenomenological objection to 
ST. It is frequently claimed that recent evidence from neurology and other cognitive 
sciences supports this view, in particular the fact that mirror neurons ‘fire’ in the same 
manner when we perform an act as when we witness someone else performing it. 
While mirror neurons have not been discovered to exist in humans but rather only in 
monkeys (the relevant test on humans would not get ethics approval), let us grant that 
coupled with other well-known findings in developmental psychology (e.g. newborn 
imitation of tongue protuberance, recognition of 6 basic emotions, etc.) they provide 
some (probabilistic) evidence for the claim that the human brain has systems that may 
be activated either “endogenously — for example, by the output of one’s own 
decision-making, emotion-formation, or pain perception systems — or exogenously, 
directly fed by the sight of other human faces and bodies” (Gordon). At least as 
‘implicit ST’ interprets such data, this suggests that one perceives the other and there 
is then a subconscious activation of mirror neurons that represent/replicate the 
experience that is being perceived. But why should these sub-personal processes be 
characterised as simulations, when ‘simulations’ on the usual understanding involves 
reference to either pretence, with an agent who does the pretending/simulating, or to 
an instrumental model that we can use to understand some other thing? Neither of 
these definitions seems to be involved in the use that implicit ST makes of the term 
simulation (Gallagher & Zahavi 179). Without a clear answer to this, it is not clear 
that these neural resonance processes aren’t better understood as part of perception 
rather than something that comes after perception as implicit ST contends. Are there 
internal replicas or representations of the other involved here, or are they directly part 
of the perceptual apprehension without intermediary in the manner that philosophers 
like Merleau-Ponty and Scheler have maintained? The scientific findings have not 
ruled out either interpretation.  
It is clear that for both ST and TT the problem of other minds is not resolved 
in an epistemic sense. In the latter case, functionalism cannot be known to hold of 
minds in general unless it holds of other minds, and that cannot be known unless they 
have been shown to exist (Hyslop). In the former case, there is no independent 
argument that our simulations are a response to an actual other person. Rather, both 
views are predominantly concerned with trying to fit in with a different overall view 
of the mind and brain emerging in the relevant sciences. 
 
1. b) CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
Having suggested that epistemology is central to the way that the problem of other 
minds is traditionally formulated in analytic philosophy and to the background 
concern to integrate (or cohere) with the knowledge claims from the various brain 
sciences, we might note that both of these foci are comparatively absent from 
continental reflections upon inter-subjectivity. Instead, philosophers like Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, sought to establish a new outlook on 
the world and our (social) place within it, precisely through overturning the modern 
conception of knowledge and the various paradoxes bound up with it, with the 
problem of other minds being envisaged as an exemplary case. The problem for the 
above philosophers is the focus on epistemology and the particular paradoxical 
understanding of epistemology that we have inherited, which is roughly the 
bifurcating one that Foucault in The Order of Things describes as the “empirico-
transcendental doublet of modern thought” (xiv) and that Merleau-Ponty calls 
empiricism and intellectualism. The worry seems to be that the modern conception of 
knowledge might serve to disguise from the fly a way out of the bottle, and, in a 
related vein, Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature suggests that 
epistemic scepticism about the external world or other minds depends upon the mirror 
of nature conception of the mind, in which the mind is assumed to be ontologically 
distinct from its environment. And based on the foregoing account of other minds 
(which resembles the thing-in-itself), it seems fair to suggest that analytic 
philosophy’s epistemic and justificatory focus concedes something to the sceptical 
problematic. Things are very different in continental philosophy, however, where the 
task is more to explicate our place in the world and there is an abiding attempt to 
establish that the other is of a different ontological order to things. This is evinced in 
the various discussion of intersubjectivity, alterity, the other, being-with (Mitsein), 
etc., that have been central to continental philosophy, occurring in virtually all of the 
canonical textsiii. The important question about the problem of other minds vis-à-vis 
the ‘divide’ hence becomes the following: is it an epistemological problem that might 
be solved (even if only probabilistically), or is it an ontological one that needs to be 
dissolved and/or shown to be untenable via phenomenological descriptions and 
transcendental arguments? 
An aversion to epistemologically inflected accounts of the existence of the 
other is manifest internally within continental philosophy. Heidegger criticises Kant 
for suggesting that it is a scandal that the problem of other minds has not been solved, 
and he instead insists that that scandal is actually the attempt to solve it (Heidegger, 
Section 43). Although Sartre praises Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger for installing the 
other at the heart of consciousness and hence contributing to the overturning of a 
dualistic worldview, they are also criticised for remaining too epistemological and for 
labouring under versions of the problem bequeathed to us by Descartes (Sartre 230). 
Likewise, when Levinas in Totality and Infinity critiques Western philosophy’s 
“imperialism of the same” – that is, its epistemological focus that unerringly aims at 
reducing the unknown object to the understanding of the knowing subject (for 
Levinas, a certain ontological picture is also bound up with this) – he is careful to 
distance himself from contemporaries like Merleau-Ponty whose philosophy of touch 
remained too epistemological in its relation with the other (Levinas 1990). This 
gesture in which epistemology becomes a dirty word is a common one in continental 
reflections on inter-subjectivity, but what might be wrong with this epistemological 
focus? One problem would be that it functions on the basis of certain philosophical 
presuppositions, most notably the existence of a knowing subject with privileged 
epistemic access in relation to their own thoughts/feelings and a more speculative or 
theoretical relation in the case of other people. The difficult task is then one of 
explaining how it is that we might have justified knowledge of other minds (and 
external things more generally). For many continental philosophers this suggests that 
something has gone wrong and that the premises that lead to such a dilemma – other 
minds as hypothesised entities – need to be rejected. Ontological re-descriptions are 
hence given to explain aspects of the phenomena in question – such as desire, shame, 
etc., which are claimed to presuppose the difference of the other – but which 
simultaneously avoid the problematic consequences that ensue if we understand that 
difference as one pertaining to epistemic access between the first and second person 
perspectives. The uncanny and surprising nature of our relations with others is 
generally not to be explained by, or understood in terms of, the possibility of 
misunderstanding and failure in relation to our knowledge of the other (McGinn 50). 
For Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and the other existential phenomenologists, this level 
of judgment – of knowing consciousness – is not our fundamental relation to the 
world, which is, rather, pre-reflective. If it can be shown that the latter precedes and is 
the condition of possibility of the former, then reflective and sceptical judgments are 
undermined. It is for reasons like this that most continental philosophers will not 
accept the Cartesian premise that we have privileged epistemic access to ourselves, 
and nor will they accept that accounting for our relationships with others via 
knowledge (or probability) can be adequate, since our connection with others is firstly 
(in both a developmental and transcendental sense) non-inferential, grounded in 
perception, affection, intensity, etc. Moreover, for those continental philosophers 
indebted to Hegel, self-consciousness (and self-knowledge) are thought to be only 
possible following an encounter with others. To summarise then, continental 
philosophers tend to respond in at least one of the two following ways to the problem 
of other minds: 1. maintain that expression in some cases gives constitutive evidence 
of mentality (although this need not preclude ambiguity); and 2. argue that we have 
certain capacities or experiences (thought, shame, meaningful expression, self-
consciousness awareness, etc.) for which the existence of others is a necessary 
condition. We mainly consider the first strategy here, the second is explored in 
another Compass entry. 
As many philosophers have noted, from Strawson to Merleau-Ponty, there is a 
clear link between the mind/body problem and the problem of other minds. If we 
consider the mind (or the mental) as transcending the body, or as radically different 
from the body, then we are immediately in a difficult position in trying to establish 
that other people do in fact exist. On the other hand, any strategy of dissolving the 
problem by pointing to a mind-body unity must not deny the perspectival asymmetry 
between first and second persons, nor the fact that communicative expressivity is a 
matter of degrees. It seems difficult to dispute, for example, that the facially 
expressive nature of emotions like anger or any of the other purportedly universal 
facial expressions (joy, disgust, surprise, sadness, fear) is more transparent than in the 
case of a complex state like nostalgia, say, and than is the case with regard to the 
knowledge that one might have of something specific. In this respect, Overgaard 
points to an important distinction in expression between “occurrent mental 
phenomena, which have a beginning and an end (e.g. sensations, perceptions, and 
emotions) and phenomena that seem to be dispositional in nature”, including beliefs 
and knowledge (Overgaard 258). Again, if a philosopher can show that this latter 
relation is not basic then we have the beginnings of an argument for inter-subjective 
expressionism. Roughly speaking, this is the argumentative strategy that the 
existential phenomenologists pursue in thematising in great detail the lived body as 
locus of agency rather than the mind; ‘mind’ does not reduce to body in the manner 
suggested by some behaviourists, but the body is enlarged and made intelligent, and 
also claimed to be the condition of reflective thinking.  
Such views tend to be accompanied by a denial of the necessity of 
intermediate entities (e.g. representations, judgments, the Kantian ‘I think’, etc.) in 
everyday inter-subjectivity. According to one of Merleau-Ponty’s examples, a friend’s 
consent or refusal of a request for them to move nearer is immediately understood 
through bodily interaction. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty goes on to suggest, this does 
not involve a perception, followed by an interpretation, and then a behavioural 
response. Rather, “both form a system which varies as a whole. If, for example, 
realising that I am not going to be obeyed, I vary my gesture, we have here, not two 
acts of consciousness. What happens is that I see my partner’s unwillingness, and my 
gesture of impatience emerges from this situation without any intervening thought” 
(Merleau-Ponty 111). The interpretation is thus built into the perception itself, rather 
than something secondary that is added to the raw perception of sense-data, in manner 
related to some of Heidegger’s thematisations of “seeing-as” in Being and Time. In 
the perception of the other, a certain gesture does not make me think of anger, or read 
anger behind the expression, but that it is anger in-itself (Merleau-Ponty 184). 
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty consistently draws attention to the way in which newborn 
babies are able to imitate the facial expression of others, both in Phenomenology of 
Perception and elsewhere, something that provides the basis for our relations to others 
thereafter. As Thomas Fuchs notes in regard to the imitative capacities of children, 
“by the mimetic capacity of their body, they transpose the seen gestures and mimics 
of others into their own proprioception and movement” (Fuchs 98). On this Merleau-
Pontyian inspired view, our body-schema responds immediately to the other’s 
expressions, and elicits a non-inferential process of what might be called ‘empathic 
perception’. 
While this kind of turn to the body is typical of phenomenology from the later 
Husserl on, it does not exhaust continental philosophy per se. The notion of the body 
‘proper’ has been contested by many recent theorists (especially post-structuralists), 
sometimes in the name of the vast differences between bodies that are occluded in the 
general deployment of the term, as well as because of the claim that the necessary 
relationship between the body and technology renders problematic some 
phenomenological accounts of the lived body. Nonetheless, virtually all continental 
philosophers dispute the view of the mind as predominantly representational, and 
there is a corresponding advocacy of forms of expressivism. This position defends the 
semantic priority of expression over representation, and thus links in with claims to 
the genesis of theoretical knowledge from practical experience/knowledge in many 
continental philosophers. Rather than committing its advocates to forms of 
irrationalism, it arguably involves a disciplining of rationality (or the propositional) as 
the dominant mode of interacting with the world, and expressive behaviour is viewed 
as meaning saturated, often in such a manner as to deny the need for inference.  
Despite the common understanding of him as a dualist, Sartre is also 
committed to a form of expressivism regarding others when he states that nothing is 
hidden in principle. Modes of conduct of bad faith are nothing separate from the way 
they are enacted in the world: style, mannerisms, and comportment. In a very 
different way, in Difference and Repetition and other texts Deleuze also advocates a 
form of expressivism and this is one of the reasons why Spinoza and Nietzsche are 
increasingly popular in continental circles. 
Levinas’ philosophy likewise attempts to negotiate that difficult balance 
between respecting the alterity of the other and yet nonetheless insisting on the 
immediate communicability of bodily expressivism. Levinas is famous for his 
discussion of the face-to-face in which in an encounter with the other we experience 
the other as an ungraspable infinity, rather than as a graspable totality, as is the case 
with our appropriative relationship with other objects. What the ‘face’ expresses is 
precisely the other’s transcendence (Levinas 198). As such, expression does not give 
us the other’s interiority, but nor does it hide this realm (Levinas 202). Another’s 
mental life is not waiting to be encountered and known in the manner of an object; 
rather, it expresses itself in an unfolding and unpredictable dynamic (Overgaard 262). 
As Overgaard argues, the “notion of expression is both intended to convey something 
more than a merely contingent relation between mind and body, and to reflect a 
certain inaccessibility of the mental lives of others” (Overgaard 256). As he goes on 
to suggest, “the Cartesian thinks the counterpart to my possible uncertainty regarding 
the mental states of another is her certainty, but this is precisely wrong” (Overgaard 
267), since even if I were certain about the other’s mental states (and surely we 
sometimes are), there would still be a difference between the perspectives. Focusing 
upon epistemic access thus seems a misleading way to explain this, and what becomes 
clear in the work of all of these philosophers is that expression is not a representation 
of an inner realm. It is an entre nous (between us) that is differently experienced by 
the expressive face and the apprehension of it by another expressive face. 
Expressivism, however, remains a marginal view within analytic philosophy, a 
position that is more commonly associated with so-called ‘postanalytic’ philosophers: 
Charles Taylor, John McDowell, and to a lesser extent, Robert Brandom. It is also 
important to note that both Taylor and Brandom trace expressivism back to its roots in 
romanticism, suggesting that the historical contestation between romanticism and 
more reason-oriented views of the enlightenment heritage is an important precursor to 
the analytic/continental divide.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many analytic philosophers would have at least two responses to this, concerning not 
only the putative immediacy of relations with others, but also any priority that is 
accorded to this mode of comportment. First, it might be suggested that such a 
position threatens to make deception and misinterpretation in our relations with others 
impossible and that the asymmetry of perspectives is thereby occluded. Second, 
analytic philosophers often maintain that these kind of phenomenological descriptions 
do not foreclose on the possibility that representations or simulations undergird such 
experiences, and that these phenomenological descriptions may hence simply be 
‘wrong’. A variant of this objection might be the response that it is psychologically 
necessary that we think that we know and interact with others, as A. J. Ayer says 
against Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s analyses of inter-subjectivity, but that this 
does not provide any kind of access to the other’s mind or more general proof that 
they do in fact exist (Ayer 1982 221). While good responses can be made to both of 
these worries, the key question concerns whether phenomenological descriptions are 
platforms from which necessary and essential conditions might be established, or 
whether they are defeasible psychological descriptions of experience that are of little 
philosophical significance. I cannot definitively resolve this here, of course, but it 
seems that we are returned to the background issue of the mind and how it works. Is 
intentionality predominantly to be understood as involving representational content, 
and thus we represent the other as having beliefs and desires? The answer is ‘no’ for 
most continental philosophers, and we have already seen some background reasons 
why this might be so: it is partly because of this general reluctance to solve issues 
with epistemology, probability, and other sophisticated judgments of this kind, at least 
if they fail to take account of our primary immersion in a social milieu. The concern is 
that if one hypostasises a reasoned relation to the world that is dependent upon a more 
practical one (genetically, developmentally, etc.), then one will never be able to 
reconstruct what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘perceptual faith’, and the way in which this 
necessarily opens upon perspectives other than our own. 
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innate conceptual framework, or the like’ (cf. Lewis 17-25). 
iiOr, occasionally, (2) ‘not at all - we just run our other systems ‘offline’, using first-personal data to 
solve a third-personal problem’ (cf. Goldman 1989 161-185). Thanks to James Chase for this 
taxonomy, to James Watt for conversations about the problem(s) of other minds, and the Australian 
Research Council for providing financial support for this project. 
iiiThink of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, which has a chapter on ‘Other Selves and the Human World’, and 
Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, which argues that ethics is first philosophy and that responsiveness to 
the other is a condition of subjectivity. More recently, such themes have continued in Lyotard, Derrida 
(somewhat notoriously in the Gift of Death: tout autre est tout autre), Paul Riceour (Oneself as 
Another), Jean-Luc Nancy (Being Singular Plural, Inoperative Community, etc), and many others. 
Concerns with the other also feature in Deleuze’s work. In Difference and Repetition and Logic of 
Sense, what Deleuze calls the other-structure and its difference from the perverse-structure occupies an 
important place in these major texts. In addition, I have also already alluded to Apel and Habermas on 
                                                                                                                                            
discourse ethics and the centrality of the Lebenswelt. 
